E. Andrew Long

610 SW Broadway, Ste. 510
Portland, Oregon 97205
andrewlongpdx@gmail.com

Attorney at Law
Admitted in Oregon and New York

503-479-8654 (o)
904-253-9957 (c)
503-549-0156 (f)

October 12, 2017

State Professional Responsibility Board
c/o Susan R. Cournoyer
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Oregon State Bar

Dear State Professional Responsibility Board –

As a preliminary matter, I want to state very clearly that I have never intentionally or knowingly engaged in any form of professional misconduct, and I have consistently sought to remedy any mistakes at the earliest opportunity. In any event, I am not aware of any meaningful harm that has arisen as a result of my engagement in the practice of law.

That said, I acknowledge that a history of enduring traumatic violence, and the ongoing struggle to prevent alienation and/or other abuse of my children, could potentially impact the practice of law. I am committed to continuing to address any such issues as they arise on an ongoing basis. However, that is not why I am writing a special response days before the SPRB.

Need for Special Response and Submission of Additional Materials

The present response is given because I was informed by letter dated October 4, 2017 that the SPRB will consider on October 14 whether to request my immediate suspension from practice pending investigation.

I was absolutely shocked. There is no basis in my conduct for any sort of emergency measure. Therefore, I have worked incessantly, going without sleep a couple of times and putting everything else aside except critical client matters, to figure out what has led to this state of affairs. I am exhausted and hope you'll forgive any errors in this letter.

The allegations suggested by the October 4 letter are unfounded and hyperbolic. They do not appear intended to protect the public so much as to damage me personally.

My assessment of the facts I have uncovered over the last few weeks suggests that the perfect storm of accusations against me (from an eviction to the implications I am currently responding to) arises primarily from my wife (Amy Long)'s desire to control the outcome of the final trial in our dissolution, which is scheduled for November 13, 2017.[1]

The disciplinary concerns expressed by the October 4, 2017 letter are interwoven with a larger set of facts involving Laura Roach (a friend I attempted to support in an effort to re-

[1] Among the additional materials submitted, I enclose a brief statement by a former law faculty colleague, who then served as my lawyer in the early part of my divorce, Rebekah Gleason Hope. She notes that, based on what she has seen of Ms. Long, my conclusion is entirely plausible.

stabilize her life), Morgana Alderman (my former legal assistant, who decided to go to law school because of working with me), and Ms. Long. Ms. Long and I have been embroiled in a highly contentious dissolution and custody case in Florida since October 2014. Ms. Alderman's attorney, Beth Creighton, also seems to play a role in the unnecessary and unreasonable escalation of actions against me.

The remainder of this letter will focus on the facts and analysis necessary to address each of the provisions cited in the October 4, 2017. Then, I will note several recent developments that appear related. Finally, I will very briefly touch on how the present situation might be integrated with two other matters before you, and how all of this fits into my growing and increasingly effective practice.

Factual Background

All matters involving me that are now before you bear signs of my past traumatic experience. [2] Those traumatic experiences were so impactful, for a time, that I did not practice law. By late 2015, I believed myself capable, tested the waters through a friend's firm and, ultimately, started my practice in earnest in January 2016. If I display unusual or apparently obsessive behaviors, such as excessively emotional statements in text messages or a high volume of texting, these behaviors generally reflect something from the past.[3] Regardless, as supported by enclosed comments by recent clients, I am practicing competently and, further, providing legal services to people who may not receive them otherwise, as well as educational opportunities to college/post-college level young people considering law school.

As the number of false allegations recounted above and my subsequent financial devastation suggest, Ms. Long became very adept at making well-timed and initially convincing, but wholly false and malicious, allegations to co-opt legitimate institutions into advancing her illegitimate objectives. It appears to me that Ms. Roach has taken up the torch for Ms. Long since they began talking no later than early July 2017. All of this is eerily familiar. I know for sure that I did not hit Ms. Roach, and I was as shocked to learn of her secret relationship with Ms. Alderman as to learn of her connection to Ms. Long, but I have not yet had time to conduct full discovery and obtain all relevant documents.[4]

In a September 4, 2017 text message, before I even knew that Ms. Roach had alleged that I hit her, Ms. Alderman wrote "If they evict him, he'll fight it." Ms. Roach replied, "It may be entertaining to watch him waste all the rest of his money doing that," then added: "Amy might be home free." (enclosed)

[2] My wife became extremely unstable, severely violent, and fixated on annihilating me over the last three of our seventeen years together (2011-14). Over the first few months of separation, she lodged five sets of false allegations to block my access to our three children in an effort to control custody. All such allegations against me were fully dismissed, whereas she was enjoined for violence and compelled to drug treatment, but after nineteen hours in the trial court and an appeal, the children reside with her in Florida under a temporary order.

[3] I discussed this precise issue with Ms. Alderman many times over the course of the 10 months she worked with me.

[4] The forcible entry and detainer (FED) process occurs on very short timelines to allow landlords to remove tenants who do not pay rent without enduring months without income. My motion to continue or to adjust the discovery service timeframes was denied in TMT Development v. Edward A. Long (Multnomah Co. Case No. 17LT13201) prior to trial, but I have asserted an argument on that basis in post-trial motions and intend to advance it in an appeal. Further, I have arranged for subpoenas *duces tecum* and other documentary production in connection with my dissolution case, where the materials are also relevant, and expect service as soon as possible. This may be challenging if the attorneys representing my accusers (whom I do not know how to locate) do not accept service. Ms. Creighton has declined to do so at least three times to date.

On September 15, 2017, I requested a trial in the FED action after we were unable to settle at the initial appearance. At that time, I expected that Ms. Alderman would be a good witness for me, but she had expressed that she did not want to be involved.

On September 20, 2017, I hand delivered a subpoena *duces tecum* and a subpoena for trial to Ms. Alderman. It was the only time that I knocked on Ms. Alderman's door without prior invitation, and she appeared to be amused when she accepted the subpoenas. The subpoena *duces tecum* sought phone and text records because I had learned that there was some form of "secret alliance,"[5] seemingly in opposition to me, but had very little evidence or information beyond that. Ms. Alderman did not protest, and our mutual friend Rachael Soule later told me Ms. Alderman said she didn't mind the subpoenas.

Communications with Ms. Alderman: RPC 4.4(a) and 4.2

RPC 4.4(a) – Respect for Rights of Third Persons

RPC 4.4(a) provides, in part, that a lawyer "shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, harass or burden a third person."[6] All of my communications have had a legitimate and substantial purpose. As discussed below, even if annoying, all of my messages had another substantial purpose as well.

On September 21, 2017, Beth Creighton emailed, notifying me of her representation and purporting to order me to "cease and desist" from contacting Ms. Alderman. On September 23, 2017, I received a second letter (dated September 21) advising me the Ms. Alderman would not comply with the subpoenas because they did not comply with ORCP 55B (which meant that the service timing requirements were not satisfied, because they cannot be satisfied in the time allotted for an FED action to proceed to trial). My September 23 email response, enclosed herewith, advised Ms. Creighton that I wanted to assess whether Ms. Alderman (a Florida native) shared Ms. Roach's new affinity for my wife and, thus, could become an adverse witness because I would wait to depose if so.

Shortly before her last day working at my practice, August 10, 2017, Ms. Alderman agreed to meet with me to discuss the transition for her and her role in training someone new. I was also interested in why she was quitting,[7] feedback she might have overall, and I wanted to be sure her computer access to my client and administrative files would be removed..

[5] The phrase was used in a text from Laura Roach to Morgana Alderman on September 13, 2017, which has been included with enclosed materials. The exchange also suggests Ms. Alderman's purported desire to avoid participating in the eviction by referencing a "no subpoena option."

[6] The remainder of 4.4(a), which prohibits a lawyer from "knowingly us[ing] methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person." Does not appear remotely relevant to anything in this, except arguably the same conversations via text message that apparently raised witness tampering concerns, where the arguments would seem to be identical.

[7] My current understanding is that Ms. Alderman quit because (as I learned through limited discovery of text messages on approximately September 28, 2017) she and Ms. Roach had decided in about March 2017 to deceive me by pretending that they did not spend time together when in fact they did and communicated at length in multiple forums. The vast majority of their text messages in a 225-page document, which I will provide on request, involves Ms. Roach speaking negatively about me in various ways, and Ms. Alderman occasionally agreeing. Thus, despite an amicable relationship in-person, it appears Ms. Alderman felt increasingly conflicted internally and quit to relieve that pressure.

Ms. Alderman cancelled and re-scheduled about three or four time before August 31. We were supposed to meet that evening as well but she did not show up, although I waited over an hour and a half. I felt that her behavior was disrespectful and intentionally hurtful. Approximately a week later, Ms. Alderman was to bring her computer to the office so we could both verify that she no longer had access to client files and that anything on her hard-drive was erased. She called at the last minute and cancelled.

Only on October 11 – two months after Ms. Alderman left my employ – did Ms. Creighton provide a statement that Ms. Alderman has not and will not access such files. I am not sure that Ms. Creighton's statement satisfies my ethical obligation to safeguard client property, but it is something, which more than Ms. Alderman was giving me. Thus, concern about safeguarding client property has been a primary motivation for my contact with Ms. Alderman.

The other major concern driving my contact with Ms. Alderman is whether she will testify on my wife's behalf. The issue is that Ms. Alderman seems to now be enamored of my wife and to believe I am a bad parent. I explained that Ms. Long emotionally brutalized my children after my first several visits with them, including a time she compelled them to make allegations against me to a therapist that were later fully discredited; because of this history, I did not want to re-create a degree of closeness that could be dangerous for them when they returned to Florida. I also explained that because their mother is intensely dependent on them (as she used to be on me), I felt it was important to allow them as much space and decision-making authority as possible. Her response to these ideas, in a September 4, 2017 message to Ms. Roach (included with the enclosures), was "[t]he fact that he says Amy brainwashed them is insane haha my view of him completely changed when I saw how he interacted with his kids and vice versa." Although I had not yet seen that text, I could tell back in July and August that she was not supportive of my views. If Ms. Alderman is going to take the stand for Ms. Long, I want an opportunity to depose her.

I have said several times that if this concern and the client property concerns were met – or if Ms. Alderman would meet to discuss these matters so I can get an honest sense of her perspective – I would stop contacting so regularly. Also on October 11, Ms. Creighton finally informed me that Ms. Alderman has no intent to participate in the divorce in my dissolution case.

In sum, the above referenced reasons for contact provide "'substantial purpose' other than to embarass, delay, harass or burden" Ms. Alderman. Therefore, I have not violated RPC 4.4(a) through such communications.

RPC 4.2 – Communication with a Represented Person

Once Ms. Creighton began asserting that I may be violating RPC 4.2, I let her know that I was unable to determine the scope of representation and that such scope would determine the topics about which I could contact Ms. Alderman a(messages on this topic are enclosed). Ms. Creighton consistently attempted to define a boundless scope of representation. For example, she answered affirmatively on October 7, 2017 when I asked: "So, your claim is that because you represent her, I am not allowed to contact her about anything unless and until you say it is OK, correct?" Along with describing the position as "patently absurd," I offered two light-hearted but analytically serious responses, to which Ms. Creighton did not respond:

> A lawyer is not a walking restraining order, purchaseable at any time to keep any lawyer from contacting a person. Either that or I'm going to start collecting advanced retainers from every lawyer's spouse whom I suspect of cheating, so they can turn me on and off at will to control domestic disputes.

And, separately:

> Here is a hypothetical. Let's say Morgana acquires a controlling interest in a company that makes shoes from puppy skin. This outrages puppy lovers and they decide to begin a daily email campaign. Morgana then hires you. Are you saying the email campaign would have to stop because she has a lawyer, that only lawyers would have to stop contacting her, or that there is something fundamentally different about that situation than this one?

These are good-faith efforts on my part to interpret and apply the rule to the best of my ability. I honestly do not know why Ms. Creighton represents Ms. Alderman, except that Ms. Alderman would like me to stop messaging her. That, however, would render meaningless the statutory scheme for stalking protective orders, harassment, and other enjoinable or prohibitable conduct that consists primarily of contacting another person.[8]

> The Oregon Supreme Court has explained:
>
> *RPC 4.2 does not prohibit all communications between a lawyer and a person represented by counsel*. Rather, that rule prohibits communications between lawyers and represented persons only when (1) the communication occurs in the course of the lawyer's representation of a client or the lawyer's interests; (2) the person with whom the lawyer communicates is represented; (3) the communication is on the subject of both the lawyer's representation and the person's representation; and (4) the lawyer knows that the person is represented on that subject.

Ms. Creighton advocates applying RPC 4.2 with "Andrew Long" personally as the subject of representation. I vigorously disagree. The disciplinary rules are not a means of imposing a restraining order without any showing that I have caused any harm or made objectively disturbing statements. Given her argument, it has been legitimately difficult to determine what, if any, subjects are actually within th scope of this particular representation for RPC 4.2 purposes.

[8] I have heard several judges state, usually when denying a request for a stalking protective order, that the law does not prohibit someone from annoying another. On September 11, 2017, I stated the following in an email to Ms. Alderman: "I have texted and emailed A LOT, but both give you complete control of whether and when you process them. I have called OCCASIONALLY, at reasonable hours. You are not supposed to like it, but I am not, IN ANY WAY, taking even the slightest chunk of your autonomy. I respect you as a person. I think you are likely to forget or not even know, that you have caused me EXTREME difficulty with your silence. The constant writing is, as it was when I did it to Amy, a way to protest and stand my ground WITHOUT FORCING ANYTHING ON YOU." I am not sure I would have pursued this course if I knew I would be defending it now, but I still do not understand RPC 4.2 to be an offensive rule designed to create a special restraining order for lawyers and, given the substantial purpose to the communication overall, the communication does not violate RPC 4.4(a).

In good faith, I believe that I have fully complied with RPC 4.2 in every instance, involving Ms. Alderman and everyone else.

RPC 8.4(a)(2) –

I honestly do not see any basis for any accusation arising under RPC 8.4(a)(2) . The Rule provides that it is a violation to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." The October 4 letter cites to four statutes. I will touch on the core argument for each, but will otherwise take an abbreviated approach because I understand the OPRC has a large agenda and also because I do not believe more than a single argument per statute is necessary. If, however, any member disagrees with my analysis, I hope it will be recalled that I have not attempted anything close to an exhaustive discussion.

While testifying at the recent trial on the effort to evict me, Ms. Alderman affirmed what she has said to me personally many times – I have never made any direct threat of physical harm to her. Since there was no physical threat of harm and no fear of physical harm, then I cannot have violated 166.065(1)(c) because there is also no indication that I threatened to commit a felony. Even if any of my statements could be misunderstood by strangers, Ms. Alderman understood any such alleged "threats" as nonserious hyperbole. Thus, as demonstrated by her testimony, my conversations with her d, would not reasonably cause alarm. Under ORS 163.732, the absence of "reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety" is decisive, and Ms. Alderman's testimony is conclusive in the absence of contrary evidence.

Similarly, texts from September 4, 2017 show that Ms. Roach and Ms. Alderman were actively looking to attach a finding of wrongdoing to Mr. Long, and Ms. Alderman noted that she "looked up harassment and he doesn't really meet the elements." Subsection (1)(c) cited in the letter specifically requires "threat to inflict serious physical injury on that person or to commit a felony," neither of which are present here.

ORS 163.275 requires coercing someone to do or not do something by instilling fear that another will do or not do various listed acts, which include unlawful injury to person or property or any crime, making false accusation, falsely testifying (or withholding testimony) regarding another's case, or abusing a position as a public servant. None of these appear relevant here. Arguably, one might analogize to my statement that I would or would not serve subpoena, but even if that stretch isn't too far, it is not a "do this or else" of unrelated items. There are clear and stated reasons that I need to depose Ms. Alderman before the child custody trial, so giving her a deadline is not coercion – it is notice with a way to avoid the deposition. The same is true regarding help with admission or a positive vs. negative statement to a state bar reference request. If I know her to be a callous liar who has undermined my interests for no apparent reason and then demanded silence and never even apologized let alone made amends, I would be acting in good faith. It is elementary that one cannot coerce another by "threatening" to act in good faith. She has some time to make amends but the time will pass – I gave her notice.

The allegations under ORS 162.285 might be a result of Ms. Roach's phrasing, which, taken out of context, seemed to suggest she would have to lie. At approximately 6:00 am on September 20, Ms. Roach spontaneously brought up the allegations: "If I need to I'll take the stand andrew [sic] and refute everything or whatever hopefully not perjuring myself." Ms.

Roach's phrasing, particularly when offered spontaneously without my consent or agreement, says nothing of my ethics.

My response was: "Thank you. I hope you will not have to. We should plan to meet and discuss. As long as I am not found to have hit you in any way that Amy can use, I have no beef." I was thanking Ms. Roach for agreeing to tell the truth about me on the stand. Any worries Ms. Roach may have had about perjuring herself with respect to other issues, such as what she might have said in security reports, or whether she might find it necessary to lie about any other activities, were not my concern.I did not hit anyone, and I am confident that anything I said, viewed in that light, supports my commitment to the Bar's ideals of truth-seeking and honesty.

Although I have not had an opportunity to review a transcript of my cross examination of Ms. Roach in the FED trial, I recall discrepancies, as are frequently the case with imperfect human perception and recollection. . I am absolutely sure that I never "knowingly induces or attempt to induce a witness to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold testimony.

RPC 8.4(a)(4) -

Whether "interfering" is a lower standard than the statutes above is unclear,but regardless, I see nothing to suggest anything on point because, understood in context, all of myno communication encouraged and promoted truthful testimony.

Related Events

Witness Tampering

When I learned that the SPRB would examine whether I had illegally or unethically influenced witnesses, I was not sure whether to laugh or cry. I continue to receive several threats per week that, while not purporting to relate to the eviction, I believe to be connected with Ms. Roach.

One of my witnesses for the eviction trial did receive a specific threat related to testifying, however, I warned her that materials would be a matter of public record and we decided to withhold the name out of concern for her safety, but she wanted the SPRB to know that the activities had occurred not because of me, but to me and my witnesses. I have enclosed a declaration by Heidi Glick, which provides some details of the threat that she would suffer physical violence if she testified. The existence of the threat was noted briefly while she was on the stand (and subsequently stricken), but no details were given.

Second, my former student Rachael Soule, who introduced me to Ms. Alderman, was expected to testify and was issued a subpoena that she agreed to accept by email. Ms. Soule appeared Monday, where I saw her talking with Ms. Alderman sometime after lunch. She failed to appear on Tuesday, when I told her from the outset she was likely to testify. She did not call me or write me, and until several days after the trial.

Stalking Protective Order

After this letter was substantially written, late on October 11, 2017, I was served with a stalking protective order granted ex parte (Multnomah County Case No. 17SK02117) to Ms. Alderman. I was not particularly surprised; the hearing date is set for after the date on which my final divorce trial is scheduled.

My brief review of the allegations in the order suggests that it probably should not have issued. There is not a single direct threat of physical harm. However, Ms. Alderman seems to have creatively woven together phrases from a number of emails and text messages to emphasize anything that could be interpreted (out-of-context) as threatening violence. I have enclosed some of the messages she drew from in full text form in a file titled "Some Full-Text for Salking Petition."

My firm belief is that my relationship with Ms. Alderman *solely* because Ms. Roach and then also Ms. Long so frequently spoke of me negatively and, at least Ms. Roach but probably both women, have told her of wholly fabricated misdeeds that I was alleged to have committed. The purpose, for Ms. Roach may have initially been jealousy because I spent most of my time with Ms. Alderman when she was helping me to establish basic office systems and I was training her to be my legal assistant. Subsequently, I would presume that whatever motivated Ms. Roach to make false allegations would apply to Ms. Alderman too.[9]

I cannot say whether Ms. Alderman committed perjury, but my memory of cross examining her last week suggests that she may have. At the very least, her narrative appear s designed (as opposing counsel's closing argument in the eviction case was) to play on stereotypes of abusive males and victimized women. When Ms. Aldermen first started to feel uncomfortable for then-unknown reason, I asked her many times if she felt comfortable and safe. There was many times that we worked alone in an office into the evening and Ms. Alderman stated in a credible way that she had no concerns.[10] On September 4, 2017, Ms. Roach and Ms. Alderman texted (secretly, of course) about what else they could do as I was about to be evicted. (see enclosed texts). When Ms. Roach suggested a restraining order or harassment, Ms. Alderman concluded neither would work and stated: "He's never physically tried to hurt me or anything. I'm not sure I could get a restraining order against him." To my knowledge, the only significant changes since that text are that I was evicted based solely on Ms. Roach's false allegations, and Ms. Alderman hired Ms. Creighton.

In what I am sure appeared to be an unusual move, I wrote to Ms. Creighton shortly after I became aware of her representation. I laid out very briefly much of what I have explained in this letter and asking whether she would accept service on behalf of Morgana (she declined). I

[9] I have circumstantial reasons to suspect that payment of money may be a primary motivation, but require further discovery to investigate this possibility. Moreover, some of the information is highly inflammatory and I'm not interested in painting others negatively unless there is a clear and important reason to do so.

[10] There has been some reference to a prior legal assistant who commenced a law suit. The suit settled pre-answer, almost immediately after I deposed another woman who had served as a legal assistant. She noted that the experience was an excellent learning opportunity, that the more time she spent with me the more comfortable she became, and that she genuinely believed that I created good opportunities for young people like herself to get a feel for the work of a lawyer and the operation of law. As previously noted, Ms. Alderman has decided to go to law school because of her experience working with me.

asked Ms. Creighton to join me in taking a constructive rather than combative approach, explained the nature of my interaction with Ms. Alderman and my concerns regarding Ms. Long and Ms. Roach. I subsequently asked Ms. Creighton to meet with me, by phone if necessary, at least three or four times – we still have not met. I have repeatedly been struck with how stridently Ms. Creighton seems to be certain that I am abusive despite enormous amounts of evidence to the contrary, including an email of September 23 in which I stated to Ms. Creighton: "Let me be extremely clear: I WILL NOT NOW, NOR EVER, HARM OR UNDERMINE THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF MORGANA ALDERMAN."

For these and other reasons, once my head clears from this very painful and arduous experience, I will evaluate whether I have a duty to report possible misconduct related to Oregon RPC 3.1 and/or 3.2(d) or (a) with regard to the stalking order, as well portions of 3.4 (such as 3.4(b)) with regard to the eviction trial, and/or possibly other provisions.

My Practice Provides Public Benefit and Poses NO Risk of Harm

In my practice, I maintain a substantial portion of my clients that represent underserved populations in some way. While some are underserved due to poverty or membership in a traditional disadvantaged group, more of them are people who have become discouraged and lost rights due to abusive situations, repeated poor experiences with the legal system, or traumatic experiences that have led them to feel misunderstood and poorly served by prior attorneys.

In addition, although I now have a very experienced legal assistant, I recently got together with PSU Professor Chris Shortell and have begun hosting interns to help with office organization and get a feel for what law practice and/or legal analysis is like. So far, I 've seen a promising group who are either seriously considering whether to attend law school or firmly dedicated to it. Having been on the faculty of three ABA law schools where I taught first-year Property for seven years, I think I can offer these students relatively rare insight into both the academic and practical aspects of working with the law. I'm also particularly good at helping students raise their LSAT scores rather quickly.

Thus, I sincerely believe the uninterrupted continuation of my practice is a clear net benefit to the public. Honestly, I am completely unable to understand how continuation of my practice could even potentially result in harm to Ms. Alderman or anyone else.

I do not think allegations underlying this bar complaint are actually about my conduct The texts between Ms. Roach and Ms. Alderman appear to seek a way to assist my wife in the custody case, and Ms. Roach, especially, testified very firmly that she wants my children to remain with their mother. All of the allegations of potential wrong-doing arose from the actions of Ms. Roach and Ms. Alderman, and my efforts to contain or refute their assistance to my wife in the custody case. Any attempt to create a scenario in which any of these allegations would relate to any other member of the public or legal community would be based on speculation and/or maliciously false allegations.

Conclusion

Since receiving the October 4 letter, my overriding concern regarding the SPRC meeting has been that my clients might suffer, effectively being punished due to questions raised about my conduct. I genuinely believe, and will assure the committee in good faith, that I am fully competent to practice law and that my continuation of practice is not only a privilege for me and a benefit to my individual clients, but that it also goes toward serving an often under-served or

difficult to serve population of people with traumatic or abusive experiences, low income, and/or a history of negative experiences or questionable treatment in legal and administrative systems.

Many of my clients are extremely appreciative of the commitment I demonstrate and the work I do for them. Many have also related negative experiences with representation in the past, stating that they had all-but given up on protecting their interests (such as access to their children, the ability to leave an abusive partner, or the ability to maintain a decent home) before they met with me.

When I learned that the SPRB might view me as a risk of harm to the public, I felt it was important that you hear their voices. I asked several current or former clients if they would like to write a brief statement – every client that I asked promptly provided a statement, and all of them are enclosed. All statements are voluntary, uncompensated, and in the client's own words.

Thank you for your careful consideration of this letter and the materials submitted herewith. I await further communication and will respond promptly to any further requests.

Sincerely,

/s/ E. Andrew Long
E. Andrew Long
Attorney at Law

Enclosures:

[list]